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Recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science has argued that understanding is 
an important cognitive state that philosophers should seek to analyse. This paper offers a 
new perspective on understanding by looking to work in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. Understanding is normally taken to be inside the head. I argue that this 
view is mistaken. Often, understanding is a state that criss-crosses brain, body and world. 
To support this claim, I draw on extended cognition, a burgeoning framework in cognitive 
science that stresses the crucial role played by tools, material representations and the 
wider environment in our cognitive processes. I defend an extended view of 
understanding against likely objections and argue that it has important consequences for 
questions concerning the nature of understanding and its relationship to explanation. 
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 1  Introduction 
Recent philosophy of science has seen a growing interest in scientific understanding. In 
contrast to explanation, understanding has often been felt to be too subjective to merit 
sustained discussion by philosophers of science. One reason for this is a tendency to 
identify understanding with the distinctive Aha! feeling that we often experience when we 
explain something. However, recent work in both epistemology and philosophy of science 
has argued that, while it might be accompanied by a distinctive feeling, understanding is 
an important cognitive state that philosophers should seek to analyse (e.g. Kvanvig 2003; 
de Regt et al. 2009b). This raises a range of questions. For example, if understanding is a 
cognitive state, what is the nature of that state? Most authors agree that, in order to 
understand a phenomenon, a scientist must not only be able to recall relevant facts or 
theoretical principles; they must also “grasp” or “see” the connections between them (e.g. 
Elgin 2009; Riggs 2003). What exactly are these acts of “grasping” or “seeing” that seem 
to be characteristic of understanding (Grimm 2011)? Moreover, if understanding goes 
beyond being able to provide the facts and principles that explain a phenomenon, then 
how do explanations provide us with understanding (de Regt et al. 2009a)? 
If understanding is a cognitive state, and “grasping” and “seeing” are “psychological 
acts” (Grimm 2010, p. 342), then it is tempting to assume that they must be found inside 
the scientists’ head. I will argue that this view is mistaken. Understanding is not always in 
the head. Often, especially when scientists are dealing with complex theories and 
phenomena, understanding is a state that criss-crosses brain, body and world. To support 
this view, I draw on recent work in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Situated 
cognition is a growing movement in cognitive science that reveals how many cognitive 
tasks are performed not by internal thought processes alone, but instead rely on skilful 
exploitation of material representations, tools and the wider environment (e.g. Robbins 
and Aydede 2009). In light of this work, many philosophers of mind and cognitive science 
have argued that our cognition, and even our minds, extend beyond our brains and bodies 
into the world (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998). In recent years, a number of authors have 
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suggested that work in situated cognition and related areas might provide a fruitful 
framework for studying scientific reasoning (e.g. Bechtel 1996; Giere 2006; Nersessian 
2005; Ylikoski 2009). At the same time, there is now a burgeoning literature within 
epistemology on the consequences of extended cognition for a range of issues concerning 
knowledge, such as the relationship between knowledge and cognitive ability (Clark et al. 
2012; Pritchard 2010; Vaesen 2011). In this paper, I aim to develop an extended approach 
to understanding and defend it against a range of likely objections. By doing so, I hope to 
show that extended cognition has important implications for the questions that we ask 
about understanding, as well as knowledge. 
The discussion will proceed as follows. Section 2 will introduce some key ideas in recent 
work on understanding in epistemology and philosophy of science. Section 3 will offer a 
brief overview of situated cognition and the related notions of extended cognition and the 
extended mind. In Section 4, I will argue that the notion of extended cognition applies not 
only to explanatory inquiry or the act of giving an explanation, but to understanding 
itself: the acts of “grasping” and “seeing” taken to be characteristic of understanding 
often take place not inside the scientist’s head, but in processes that include external, 
material devices. Section 5 responds to some likely objections to this view, while Section 
6 considers criticism of the notion of extended cognition in general. Finally, in Section 7, 
I consider the implications of extended cognition for an alternative conception of 
understanding, which takes it to be an ability rather than an act of “grasping” or “seeing”. 
 2  Understanding and explanation 
Stephen Grimm (2011) distinguishes three different questions that we might ask about 
understanding. To introduce these questions, it is helpful to consider parallels with 
knowledge. According to a traditional analysis, S knows that p if and only if p is true, S 
believes that p, and S is justified in believing that p. On this view, the object of 
knowledge is a true proposition, the relevant psychological attitude is belief, and the 
normative requirement is justification. We can ask similar questions about understanding. 
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Suppose we say that “S understands P”, where P is some natural phenomenon. First, we 
might ask about the object of understanding. For example, is the object of S’s 
understanding a set of propositions about P? Or is it perhaps a model or some sort of 
abstract structure representing the phenomenon (Grimm 2011)? Second, we might inquire 
into the psychology of understanding. For example, does understanding amount to 
believing a set of propositions about P, or is some other psychological state involved 
(Grimm 2006, Trout 2007)? Third, we might wonder about the normativity of 
understanding. Here discussion has focused on whether understanding is subject to the 
same normative constraints as knowledge. For instance, does understanding require truth? 
Is it compatible with epistemic luck? (Grimm 2006; Kvanvig 2003) 
We may also add a fourth question to Grimm’s list. This is the question of the subject of 
understanding. Here the question is: who (or perhaps what) understands the phenomena? 
Again, we ask similar questions about knowledge. Often, when we say “S knows p”, “S” 
refers to an individual. But sometimes we attribute knowledge to groups. For example, we 
might say, “scientists at CERN now know that the Higgs Boson exists”. This raises a 
number of issues. For example, how does group knowledge depend upon the epistemic 
states of its members (Bird 2010)? Discussions of understanding typically regard the 
subject of understanding as an individual. For example, although they stress various 
social aspects of understanding, when considering the subject of understanding, de Regt 
et al. (2009a, p. 3) write that “this subject is typically a scientist who understands a 
phenomenon”. And yet it seems that we often attribute understanding to groups. For 
example, we might say that “scientists at CERN now understand why fundamental 
particles have mass”. We might therefore ask similar questions about group understanding 
to those we ask about group knowledge (Leonelli, forthcoming.) 
Let us focus on cases in which we attribute understanding to individuals. What is the 
psychology of understanding in such cases? Imagine that Tom and Barbara are watching a 
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Boeing 747 take off and Tom turns to Barbara and asks “Why do planes fly?”1 Let us 
suppose that Barbara is an aeronautical engineer and understands why planes fly, but Tom 
does not. What is the relevant psychological state that characterises Barbara’s 
understanding? What does Barbara possess that Tom does not? One view might be that, in 
order to understand why planes fly, Barbara must simply know Bernoulli’s principle and 
the relevant details about the plane. On this view, the psychology of understanding is 
much the same as the psychology of knowledge, namely belief. And yet it seems that Tom 
might know Bernoulli’s principle and the relevant features of the plane, while still not 
understanding why planes fly. There might be two reasons for this. First, he might know 
Bernoulli’s principle but never have attempted to apply it to the question of why planes 
fly. (Barbara: “Well, you know Bernoulli’s principle” Tom: “Yes, of course, but what’s 
that got to do with it?”) Second, even if Tom were to attempt to apply Bernoulli’s 
principle to the question of why planes fly, he might lack the ability to do so (Tom: “OK, 
I see that Bernoulli’s principle might be relevant. But how do I know the speed of the air 
around the wing?”). As Kuhn and others have pointed out, students are often able to recite 
important theoretical principles, and yet have no idea how to apply them (Kuhn 1970, pp. 
23-51). 
Most recent authors on understanding agree that it involves more than simply believing, 
or even knowing, relevant facts and theoretical principles. Instead, understanding requires 
that we also “see” or “grasp” how those facts and principles fit together. Thus, Wayne 
Riggs argues that “[a]n important difference between merely believing a bunch of true 
statements within subject matter M, and having understanding of M, is that one somehow 
sees the way things fit together. There is a pattern discerned within all the individual bits 
of information or knowledge’’ (Riggs 2003, p. 218). In a similar vein, Catherine Elgin 
writes that “to understand the Comanches’ dominance of the southern plains involves 
                                                 
1
 This example is based on Trout (2002) and Grimm (2010). 
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more than knowing the various truths that belong to a comprehensive, coherent account of 
the matter. The understander must also grasp how the various truths relate to each other” 
(Elgin 2009, p. 323). As Grimm (2006) makes clear, “seeing” or “grasping” connections 
involves more than simply believing that they hold. If an expert tells me that a difference 
in air pressure generates lift on the wing of the plane, then I might have excellent reason 
to believe this. And yet it seems that I could assent to this claim while still not “seeing” or 
“grasping” how the difference in pressure results in lift. Similarly, a mathematics pupil 
might have reason to believe that each step in a proof follows from the previous one, 
simply because her teacher tells her so. But the pupil might still not understand the 
various steps in the proof. While admitting that talk of “seeing” or “grasping” remains 
largely metaphorical, Grimm (2010) suggests that “grasping” a theoretical principle 
involves at least two things. First, it involves the ability to apply the principle to the 
world. Second, it involves the ability to anticipate how a change in one of the variables in 
the principle leads to changes in the others. The importance of such abilities is also 
emphasised by a number of other authors, including Elgin (2009) and Henk de Regt (e.g. 
2004; see also de Regt and Dieks 2005). 
Summing up, it would appear that, if Barbara understands why planes fly, then she must 
be able to do more than simply recall Bernoulli’s principle, recite lists of facts about air 
pressure, the shape of planes’ wings, and so on. In addition, she must also “grasp” or 
“see” the connections between these things. For example, she must “grasp” how 
Bernoulli’s principle applies to the air flow around the wing, “see” how the difference in 
air speed will result in a difference in pressure, “see” how the difference in pressure 
generates lift, and so on. If she properly “grasps” or “sees” these connections, then 
Barbara does more than simply believe that they hold. She enjoys a richer cognitive 
achievement, which allows her to put the information she possesses to use in various 
ways. For example, she is able to answer questions such as “What if a plane’s wings were 
flat, rather than curved?” or “What if a plane tries to fly in a vacuum?” In this way, 
understanding some phenomenon goes beyond merely possessing the various facts and 
principles that figure in a correct explanation for that phenomenon. 
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If this view of understanding is along the right lines, then we might wonder how 
understanding relates to explanation. Before we consider this question, it is important to 
note that the term “explanation” is used in many different ways. If we say “Bernoulli’s 
explanation of why planes fly is true”, it seems we are referring to a certain product of 
scientific inquiry, such as a set of claims. Following Grimm (2010), let us call these 
explanatory stories. One might think of explanatory stories as abstract entities, such as 
propositions. In what follows, however, it will sometimes be helpful to refer to the 
particular, concrete form that an explanatory story might take, such as equations written 
on a piece of paper. I will call these explanatory inscriptions. Often, though, we use 
“explanation” to refer not to a product, but to an activity. For example, if we say 
“Bernoulli’s explanation took up half of his lecture” we are referring to what Grimm calls 
the act of presenting an explanatory story. Finally, notice that we also use “explanation” 
to mean the activity of coming up with an explanatory story in the first place, rather than 
that of communicating it to others. Thus, we might say “the proper explanation of flight 
took scientists many years”. Modifying Grimm’s terminology slightly, let us call this 
explanatory inquiry. Notice that an explanatory inquiry might involve searching for an 
explanatory story that is new to science as a whole, or just to a particular individual or 
group. 
Let us focus in particular on the relationship between understanding and explanatory 
stories. Philosophers of science have tended to assume that possessing an explanatory 
story leads automatically to understanding. If understanding were simply a matter of 
knowing the appropriate principles and background conditions, then presumably gaining 
understanding would be a fairly straightforward process: the scientist would simply have 
to remember the appropriate explanatory story. On the other hand, if understanding 
involves more than belief, then the process by which the scientist gains understanding is 
likely to be more complicated. As de Regt et al. (2009a, p. 7) put it: 
[g]aining understanding through explanations is not an automatic process, 
but rather a cognitive achievement in its own right […] Once it is granted 
that deriving understanding from an explanation is a matter of ability, the 
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question arises of how that actually works. What are the mechanisms 
through which scientists extract understanding from explanations that they 
already possess? 
We will return to this question in Section 4. For the moment, the important point is that 
there is now widespread agreement that understanding is not merely an Aha! feeling but 
also an important cognitive state that merits the attention of epistemologists and 
philosophers of science. In the next section, I will introduce a burgeoning movement in 
cognitive science that I think can help us to make sense of the cognitive component of 
understanding. 
 3  Situated and extended cognition 
‘Situated cognition’ is the name given to a growing body of work in cognitive science that 
stresses the importance of interaction between the brain, body and environment in 
carrying out cognitive tasks. Along with related approaches, such as embodied cognition 
and distributed cognition, work in situated cognition encompasses a wide range of 
different disciplines, from anthropology to robotics (for an overview, see Robbins and 
Aydede 2009). Although it is not possible to survey this vast literature here, the main 
ideas may be gleaned by considering a canonical example of situated cognition, namely 
multiplication using pen and paper. 
According to neural network models, our brains are good at tasks such as recognising and 
completing patterns, not sequential or logical reasoning. And yet we are able to perform 
such reasoning. How do we manage this? In a highly influential treatment, Rumelhart et 
al. (1986, pp. 44-48) argue that the answer lies in our use of external, material 
representations. Suppose that you are asked to multiply two three-digit numbers (e.g. 567 
x 843). Most people cannot do this in their head. The task becomes a lot easier if we are 
given a pen and paper, however. For example, we might use the method of long 
multiplication, lining up the numbers carefully one underneath the other, then working 
step-by-step through the procedure and writing down the intermediate products as we go. 
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By manipulating our external, material environment in this way, we reduce a complex 
task to a series of much simpler ones (e.g., remembering 3 x 7, writing numbers in neat 
columns, and so on), each of which can be accomplished by brains that are suited to 
pattern recognition. Thus, we are able to carry out sequential or logical reasoning tasks, 
such as multiplying three-digit numbers. But such tasks are often accomplished not only 
by our brains, but by interaction with the external environment. 
Situated cognition suggests that much of our cognitive activity has a similar character to 
multiplication with pen and paper, involving interaction between brain, body and world. 
This idea has provoked a lively debate within recent philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science. Impressed by the pervasive role that external devices play within our lives, a 
number of authors have endorsed the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). Although 
HEC is perhaps most often associated with Andy Clark (e.g. 2008), related positions have 
also been defended by Richard Menary (2007), Mark Rowlands (1999), Mike Wheeler 
(2005), Robert Wilson (2004) and others. According to HEC, external devices such as 
diaries, laptops and phones can, and often do, become part of our cognitive processes. On 
this view, the pen and paper that we use in long multiplication is part of the mechanism 
that realises our cognition, just like the neurons in our brain. Wilson and Clark (2009, p. 
65) introduce the notion of a “transient extended cognitive system” (TECS). A TECS is “a 
soft-assembled whole that meshes the problem-solving contributions of the human brain 
and central nervous system with those of the (rest of the) body and various elements of 
the local cognitive scaffolding” (ibid.). Notice that, although TECS are transient, they are 
often regularly repeated. Multiplication with pen and paper is a case in point: we might 
follow a similar procedure whenever we multiply long numbers, even if we use a new 
piece of paper each time and discard it seconds later. Similarly, a seasoned solver of 
crossword puzzles might always reach for pen and paper to run through her usual routine 
of jumbling up letters to spot anagrams (ibid.). In Wilson and Clark’s view, TECS are 
extremely important. In fact, “the bulk of real-world problem solving, especially of the 
kinds apparently unique to our species, may be nothing but the play of representation and 
computation across these spectacularly transformative mixes of organismic and 
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extranorganismic resources [i.e. TECS]” (2009, p. 73). 
Many advocates of HEC are also defenders of the extended mind thesis. Indeed, 
according to Wilson and Clark, “the notion of an extended mind is nothing more than the 
notion of a cognitive extension […] that scores rather higher on the […] dimension of 
durability and reliability” (2009, p. 66). Clark and Chalmers (1998) offer the famous 
example of Otto and Inga. When Inga hears of an exhibition at the Museum of Modern 
Art she recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, and sets off. Otto is an Alzheimer’s 
patient who carries a notebook wherever he goes to record useful information and trusts 
what it says without question. When Otto hears about the exhibition, he looks up the 
information in his notebook, and sets off. According to Clark and Chalmers, Otto’s 
notebook plays a similar functional role in his life as Inga’s biological memory does in 
hers. As a result, they argue, the notebook is part of the material basis that realises Otto’s 
standing beliefs. Otto believes that the exhibition is on 53rd Street even before he looks at 
his notebook, just as Inga believes this even before consulting her memory. If standing 
beliefs count as part of our minds, then it seems that Otto’s mind extends beyond his head 
and body and into the world. 
Together, HEC and the extended mind thesis have radical implications for deep-seated 
views of the nature of mind and cognition. In what follows, I will argue that they also 
have important consequences for our view of the nature of understanding. One might 
think that making this point would require little further argument. After all, if we accept 
that cognition and mind are extended, then surely it follows immediately that 
understanding is extended. This is too quick, however. What Clark and Chalmers (1998) 
aim to establish is that, as Clark (2010, p. 82) puts it, “in fairly easily imaginable 
circumstances - ones that involved no giant leaps of technology or technique - we would 
be justified in holding that certain mental and cognitive states extended […] into the 
nonbiological world”. Clark and Chalmers argue for this claim by offering a putative case 
of extended belief, namely Otto and his notebook. Even if we accept this argument, 
however, we are still left with the question of what other cognitive states might be 
extended (if any) and how widespread such extensions are. Moreover, as we will see, the 
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notion of extended understanding might be thought to be especially problematic in ways 
that talk of other extended states, such as extended beliefs, is not. In the following 
section, then, I aim to show that understanding can be an extended state and that, in fact, 
cases of extended understanding are fairly commonplace. Afterwards, in Section 5, I will 
respond to a range of objections to the notion of extended understanding. 
 4  Extended understanding 
How might the notion of extended cognition apply to understanding? Recall the different 
senses of “explanation” discussed in Section 2. Clearly, it would be uncontroversial to 
claim that explanatory inquiry often involves external representations, tools, instruments 
and other material devices. Perhaps, then, we might try to develop an extended account of 
this inquiry, showing the way in which tools and external representations extend and 
transform scientists’ reasoning processes. It would also be uncontroversial to claim that 
external representations are involved in the act of giving an explanatory story, so 
extended cognition might also have something to offer here too. In this section, however, 
I want to argue for a more controversial claim, which is that tools, external 
representations and other material scaffoldings are involved not only in explanatory 
inquiry or the act of giving an explanatory story but also in understanding itself. In other 
words, I want to argue that the cognitive state that epistemologists and philosophers of 
science have taken to be characteristic of understanding is often realised not inside the 
scientists’ head, but in an extended system that includes external, material devices. 
Consider Tom and Barbara again. Let us now suppose that, instead of asking simply 
“Why do planes fly?”, Tom asks Barbara a more difficult why-question, such as “Why do 
planes experience Dutch roll”? Dutch roll is a complex oscillatory motion that planes 
experience when flying through turbulence (apparently named after the rhythmic motion 
executed by Dutch skaters). According to the Aerospace Engineering Desk Reference, 
“[t]he Dutch roll mode is a classical damped oscillation in yaw […] which couples into 
roll and, to a lesser extent, into sideslip. The motion described by the Dutch roll mode is 
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therefore a complex interaction between all three lateral-directional degrees of freedom. 
Its characteristics are described by the pair of complex roots in the characteristic 
polynomial” (2009, p. 235). The equations of motion that figure in the explanation of 
Dutch roll are complex and cover an entire page in the lecture notes for MIT’s graduate 
course “Aircraft Stability and Control” (How, 2004). Both the Aerospace Engineering 
Desk Reference and MIT’s lecture notes include four pairs of diagrams, each showing a 
top and rear view of a plane, indicating the sequence of steps involved in a typical Dutch 
roll cycle. Next to these diagrams is series of notes, along with a graph showing how the 
angle of the wings and nose of the plane vary during the cycle. 
Let us assume that Barbara’s training included lectures on Dutch roll. When she hears 
Tom’s question, Barbara remembers these lectures clearly and is able to recall the 
theoretical principles required to explain Dutch roll, along with the relevant facts about 
the plane. At this point, however, Barbara resorts to pen and paper. She first writes down 
some (highly simplified) equations that capture the essence of the relevant theoretical 
principles. Then she draws a quick sketch of a plane tilted to one side and considers how 
the principles apply in this case. As she does so, Barbara draws small arrows around the 
wings, showing how she would expect the aircraft to move, and then draws another quick 
sketch of the plane showing its position a moment later. Perhaps, like the MIT lecture 
notes, she might also draw a rough graph, showing how the angle of the wings changes 
over time. In this way, let us assume, Barbara is able to apply the relevant theoretical 
principles to explain Dutch roll. On the other hand, let us also assume that, if she does not 
have access to pen and paper, Barbara might be able to recall the relevant facts and 
principles but she cannot work through the steps required to connect the two together. 
Indeed, she might even be unable to anticipate the effects of qualitative changes in 
variables unless she first writes down the relevant equations so that she can inspect them, 
annotate them with arrows, cross out particular terms if their effects are negligible, and so 
on. 
What should we make of this? The key point to notice, I think, is that we would have no 
hesitation in speaking of understanding in such cases. Barbara certainly understands 
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Dutch roll. She knows the relevant facts and theoretical principles. What is more, for 
Barbara these facts and principles are not merely isolated or unrelated islands of 
knowledge. Instead, Barbara also “sees” or “grasps” the connections between these two 
things: she “sees” or “grasps” how the theoretical principles apply to the facts about the 
plane to bring about Dutch roll. For example, Barbara “sees” how a crosswind might lead 
the plane to yaw to port, “grasps” how this results in more lift on the starboard wing, 
“sees” how this causes the plane to roll to port, and so on. It is just that these acts of 
“seeing” or “grasping” do not happen entirely inside Barbara’s head. Instead, they involve 
literal, rather than merely metaphorical, acts of grasping and seeing, namely those she 
carries out in creating, manipulating and inspecting external, material representations. For 
Barbara, understanding Dutch roll is rather like multiplying three-digit numbers or 
solving a crossword puzzle: it requires interaction with external, material devices. 
Of course, the story I have just told about Barbara is a hypothetical one. Empirical work 
would be required to determine whether it offers an accurate characterisation of scientists’ 
cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, I think Barbara’s case is certainly plausible. As we have 
seen, many recent authors on understanding agree that it is a form of cognitive state that 
goes beyond merely possessing relevant information; instead, someone who understands 
can also “see” the connections or patterns that tie this information together. For simple 
theories or phenomena, this might be something that scientists can do in their heads. In 
many instances, however, this richer cognitive achievement will be something that the 
scientist can accomplish only through interacting with tools and external representations. 
In this way, Barbara’s cognitive achievement goes beyond merely possessing the relevant 
facts and principles, encompassing the richer cognitive state taken to be characteristic of 
understanding. In order to achieve this, however, Barbara makes use of external, material 
devices. To use the terminology introduced in Section 3, Barbara’s understanding of 
Dutch roll relies on transient extended cognitive systems (TECS), including equations, 
diagrams and graphs. 
If this view is along the right lines, then extended cognition will have important 
implications for a number of the issues introduced in Section 2. First, consider the subject 
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of understanding. As we saw, existing discussions typically take the subject of 
understanding to be an individual scientist, rather than a group. However, an extended 
approach suggests that, even in cases in which we attribute understanding to individuals, 
the material basis that realises their understanding is not confined to the individual’s head, 
but also includes external, material devices. Perhaps the reason that it is so easy to 
overlook this fact is that our normal attributions of understanding take place in 
environments that are thoroughly saturated with material scaffolding that supports our 
cognitive processes. This scaffolding is so ubiquitous that it is simply taken for granted. 
Unlike Otto, Barbara might not carry pen and paper with her wherever she goes in case 
she is quizzed about Dutch roll. Nevertheless, the machinery that Barbara uses for 
constructing her TECS is available almost anywhere, whether she is at her desk, 
laboratory bench, or even at the airport. 
Next, consider the psychology of understanding. As we have seen, it is commonly 
acknowledged that understanding the connections between various facts or principles 
goes beyond believing that they hold. Tom might come to believe that a crosswind leads 
to Dutch roll because he trusts Barbara’s expertise, while still not understanding it.  As a 
result, a number of authors have suggested that an important challenge for theories of 
understanding is to move beyond metaphors of “grasping” and “seeing” to offer a fuller 
characterisation of the psychological acts involved in understanding (e.g. Grimm 2011). 
From the perspective of extended cognition, we can see that the difference between 
(mere) belief and understanding is likely to lie in an assortment of different cognitive acts 
that are involved in scientists’ interactions with external, material devices, such as motor 
control, perceptual recognition and pattern-matching capabilities, as well as features of 
the devices themselves. As a result, an extended view would have important 
methodological implications for the way that we go about conducting empirical studies 
into the psychology of understanding, since it suggests the need to study scientists’ 
understanding against its normal background of tools and representational devices in the 
laboratory, rather than in artificial experimental scenarios. 
Finally, consider the relationship between understanding and explanation. Recall that here 
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the question was: how do explanatory stories provide us with understanding? Even those 
who take understanding to involve more than knowing relevant facts and principles often 
describe the move from possessing an explanatory story to gaining understanding as a 
matter of “internalisation”. For example, like Kuhn and others, Philip Kitcher (1989, p. 
438) argues that understanding requires “an extra cognitive ingredient” over and above 
simply knowing a theory’s principles. In Kitcher’s view, however, this additional 
ingredient is to be found in the “internalisation of the argument patterns” associated with 
the theory (ibid.). Extended cognition suggests that this talk of “internalisation” should be 
handled with care, however. Earlier I proposed that we use the term explanatory 
inscriptions to refer to the particular, concrete form that explanatory stories may take, 
such as equations, graphs or diagrams scribbled on paper. From the perspective of 
extended cognition, moving from an appropriate explanatory story to understanding is not 
a matter of internalising that explanatory story, but of learning how to interact in the right 
way with explanatory inscriptions.
2
 
 5  Objections 
There are a number of objections that might be made to the argument so far. One response 
would be to deny that Barbara understands Dutch roll. We might try to motivate this 
response simply by pointing to her use of external devices. Thus, it might be said that, if 
someone needs to resort to scribbling down equations, diagrams, graphs and so on to see 
how a theory applies to some phenomenon, then they don’t really understand that 
phenomenon. Put in this way, however, the objection is hardly compelling. Would we say 
                                                 
2
 Of course, these remarks are not intended as a wholesale rejection of Kitcher’s account. 
It may well be that Kitcher himself did not intend talk of “internalisation” to be taken 
too seriously and would be sympathetic to a view along the lines suggested. Thanks to 
Arnon Levy for discussion on this point. 
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that someone can’t do arithmetic simply because they need to use pen and paper? Of 
course, we might say that they can’t do mental arithmetic. But why should it be a criterion 
for possessing scientific understanding that we should do without tools and material 
representations? If extended cognition is along the right lines, then an enormous amount 
of our cognitive activity relies on interaction with material devices and environmental 
props. Given the ubiquity of such devices within scientific practice in particular, it is 
difficult to see why we would insist that they play no part in scientific understanding. 
Moreover, as I have suggested already, given the complexity of the theories, data and 
phenomena that scientists are interested in, dependence on external devices is likely to be 
the norm, rather than the exception. If we insist that understanding take place in the 
absence of any material support, then we may well be forced to conclude that scientists 
understand much less of the world than we think. 
One way to try to motivate the claim that Barbara lacks understanding would be to draw 
on the contrast between understanding and following a procedure by rote. Thus, we might 
argue that, since she needs to rely on written equations, diagrams, graphs and so on, 
Barbara is simply following a certain procedure to arrive at the required solution, and this 
is not enough to show that she possesses understanding. This reply mischaracterises 
Barbara’s abilities, however. It is perfectly true that being able to follow a procedure by 
rote does not demonstrate understanding. Someone who blindly follows a set of 
instructions is unlikely to be able to react to changes or interruptions, anticipate what 
might happen in different circumstances, and so on. But Barbara might be able to do all of 
these things. If Tom asked, “What if the wings were swept backwards like on a military 
jet?”, Barbara might be perfectly capable of applying the relevant principles to this new 
scenario and “seeing” how swept back wings would change the outcome. As before, she 
might simply be unable to do this without relying on external devices. On the other hand, 
someone could memorise a procedure and follow it without relying upon any external 
props, and yet we would still not say they possessed understanding. 
Another possible response to the claim that understanding is extended would be to 
suggest that I have misinterpreted Barbara’s actions. When she writes down various 
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equations, diagrams and graphs, it might be argued, Barbara is simply using these devices 
to explain Dutch roll to Tom. Barbara’s interactions with these external representations 
are not part of her “grasp” of Dutch roll at all, but simply part of her act of giving an 
explanatory story. On this view, Barbara’s formulas and diagrams play a merely 
communicative role, while her reasoning process itself takes place entirely inside her 
head. The difficulty with arguing in this way, of course, is that it amounts simply to 
denying the main thrust of work in situated cognition, namely that tools and external 
devices sometimes play an important role in the reasoning process itself. When we 
multiply two three-digit numbers using pen and paper, the argument goes, the paper isn’t 
merely recording our internal processes. Instead, it is radically transforming the nature of 
the cognitive task that we must carry out. Similarly, a situated approach to understanding 
would suggest that the various equations, diagrams and graphs that Barbara constructs do 
not merely serve to communicate her thoughts to Tom. Instead, interacting with these 
external representations plays a key role in enabling her “grasp” of the phenomena. Of 
course, the success of this approach has yet to be seen, and it will take detailed empirical 
work to determine precisely how external devices support scientists’ understanding. But 
we certainly cannot simply assume at the outset that these devices serve only a 
communicative function. 
Rather than arguing that Barbara’s actions should be seen as the act of giving an 
explanatory story, we might instead claim that they are part of an explanatory inquiry. 
Even though she encountered the explanatory story for Dutch roll in her training, it might 
be argued, Barbara resorts to pen and paper because she has forgotten that story and must 
re-discover it. On this view, extended cognition might have a lot to say about explanatory 
inquiry, but understanding itself would remain an entirely internal matter. The problem 
with arguing in this way, however, is that it would seem to show too much. When Tom 
asks “Why do planes fly?” Barbara might first recall Bernoulli’s principle, then think for 
a moment before bringing to mind an image of a wing and “seeing” how lift results. Let 
us suppose that Barbara can do this entirely in her head. Would we say that, because she 
had to go through this thought process, Barbara did not understand why planes fly after 
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all? This would seem to make our understanding of any phenomenon far too fleeting, 
disappearing whenever we are not consciously attending to it. Of course, if someone 
assures us that they do understand why planes fly but then has to rack their brains for half 
an hour before coming up with the answer, we might begin to wonder whether they had 
really understood it in the first place. Once again, however, this has little to do with 
whether they rely on external props or not. When she hears Tom ask about Dutch roll, 
Barbara might begin writing and drawing immediately, without any uncertainty or 
hesitation. 
An alternative response begins by drawing a distinction between explicit and implicit 
understanding.
3
 While explicit understanding is a cognitive state of “seeing” or 
“grasping”, implicit understanding might be seen as the disposition to achieve this 
cognitive state under certain circumstances. Before performing her calculations, the 
objection goes, Barbara possesses an implicit understanding of Dutch roll. Afterwards, 
she gains an explicit understanding. Once achieved, however, this explicit understanding 
is an entirely internal matter and the pen and paper may safely be discarded. Having pen 
and paper to hand is simply part of the stimulus conditions required for the disposition to 
be manifested, much like the presence of oxygen in the room. The difficulty with this line 
of argument is that, once again, it appears simply to deny the main claim of work in 
situated cognitive science, which is that external and internal processes often operate 
together when we carry out cognitive tasks. In our example, Barbara connects together 
the relevant facts and theoretical principles by manipulating various external 
representations, such as equations, diagrams and graphs. Why should we assume that, at 
some point in this interaction, these external representations are copied into some internal 
representational medium, yielding a “grasp” of Dutch roll that is entirely inside the head? 
                                                 
3
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of argument. The exact 
formulation is my own. 
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Taking a different tack, a critic of the notion of extended understanding might ask where 
we ought to draw the line. As we have seen, understanding is commonly taken to be a 
cognitive state that involves possessing various items of knowledge (or perhaps merely 
belief) and “seeing” or “grasping” the connections between them. In Barbara’s case, I 
have argued, “seeing” or “grasping” Dutch roll is (partly) external, while her knowledge 
remains an internal matter (she is able to recall the relevant principles without props). 
What if Barbara had to rely on a prompt card to recall the relevant equations instead? 
Would we still be willing to attribute understanding to her? In some cases, I’m inclined to 
say that we would. But now a critic might ask how far we are willing to go. Suppose that 
Tom is simply sitting at his computer with the web address for MIT’s online course in 
aeronautics to hand. We would surely not want to say that Tom understands Dutch roll. 
And yet it seems that he has access to all the relevant information and, given sufficient 
time, he might well be able to work through the course and come to “grasp” how the 
relevant principles apply. How is the proponent of extended understanding to rule out 
such cases? 
Delineating the boundaries of cognition is an important challenge facing all theories of 
extended cognition, and I cannot hope to offer a definitive answer here (e.g. Rupert 2004; 
Sprevak 2009; Clark 2008). It is possible to offer some rough and ready considerations, 
however. If understanding requires believing the relevant facts and principles, then the 
criteria for extended understanding will be at least as strict as the criteria for extended 
belief. Clark and Chalmers (1998) look to capture these criteria in what are often referred 
to as conditions of “glue and trust” (Clark 2010). These conditions require that, like 
biological memory, an external device must be reliably available and typically invoked, 
easily accessible whenever required and automatically endorsed (Clark and Chalmers 
1998, p. 17; see also Clark 2010 p. 46). Even if he always carries his computer with him 
and its internet connection is highly reliable, the information that Tom can access on 
Dutch roll is unlikely to be easily accessible to him or automatically endorsed, especially 
if he has to rely on a range of other sources in order to work through it. There will also be 
further conditions for extended understanding. As we noted earlier, if we ask someone a 
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why-question and they take a long time to respond, or are extremely hesitant or uncertain 
in their answer, then we are less inclined to attribute understanding, meaning that Tom is 
likely fall short in this regard as well. 
Finally, one reason why we might feel some resistance to the idea that understanding is 
not in the head concerns the phenomenological aspect of understanding. As we have 
noted already, understanding often involves a distinctive Aha! feeling that we experience 
when the penny finally drops and we come to understand some phenomenon. 
Understanding something just feels different to merely knowing things about it. If 
understanding involves a distinctive feeling then it might be argued that, unlike 
multiplying three-digit numbers or solving crosswords, it cannot be extended outside the 
head. After all, we feel things in our heads or bodies, not in the pen and paper. On closer 
inspection, however, this line of thought is not convincing. As we saw in Section 2, recent 
discussions in both epistemology and philosophy of science have argued that, even if it is 
often accompanied by an Aha! feeling, understanding is first and foremost a cognitive 
state. As Grimm puts it, “there is a distinction to be made between the psychological act 
of ‘‘grasping’’ or ‘‘seeing’’ that seems to be fundamental to understanding, and the 
phenomenology that accompanies the act” (2010, p. 342). If we accept this view, then it 
seems that we might grant that the phenomenology accompanying understanding remains 
internal to the scientist, while still recognising that understanding itself – that is, the 
cognitive state of “grasping” or “seeing” - extends into the world. 
 6  Extended or embedded? 
For proponents of HEC, situated cognition shows that cognition extends beyond the head 
into the body and environment. Not all commentators who are sympathetic to situated 
cognition are also advocates of HEC, however. As an alternative to HEC, Rupert (2004) 
introduces the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC). According to HEMC, 
“Cognitive processes depend very heavily, and in hitherto unexpected ways, on 
organismically external props and devices and on the structure of the external 
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environment in which cognition takes place” (Rupert 2004, p. 393). Like HEC, then, 
HEMC acknowledges the profound importance of external devices for our cognitive 
processes. Unlike HEC, however, HEMC stops short of claiming that those external 
devices are cognitive (or mental). Instead, according to HEMC, cognition (and the mind) 
remains inside the head. On this view, TECS are hybrid systems, involving both cognitive 
and non-cognitive elements: the pen and paper are crucial to explaining how are able to 
carry out tasks like multiplying three-digit numbers, but they are not part of our cognitive 
processes. Notice that, although less radical than HEC, HEMC shares many of its 
important theoretical and methodological consequences, since it also emphasises the role 
played by external devices and radically alters our view of what happens inside our head 
when we carry out cognitive tasks. 
Both HEC and HEMC thus agree that much of our cognitive activity depends upon the 
interaction of internal and external elements, including the brain, body and environment. 
The point at issue between them concerns which of these elements count as cognitive (or 
mental). I cannot hope to settle this debate here (for an overview, see Menary 2010). 
Instead, my aim in this paper has been to argue that understanding offers another example 
of the crucial role that external devices play in our cognitive lives. Understanding, like 
multiplication, is not always in the head. Fortunately, this is something that proponents of 
both HEC and HEMC can agree on. What they will disagree over is how this should be 
interpreted. HEC will claim that understanding is a cognitive state that extends outside the 
scientists’ head. By contrast, HEMC will claim that only that which takes place inside the 
scientists’ head deserves to be counted as cognitive. On this view, Barbara’s 
understanding of Dutch roll turns out not to be a cognitive state after all, but a hybrid state 
involving cognitive and non-cognitive parts. On either interpretation, however, the proper 
object of study for epistemologists and philosophers of science who wish to study 
understanding will not be confined to the scientist’s head. 
Although I have favoured the interpretation given by HEC, I cannot hope to argue 
decisively for this view here. I do, however, wish to point out that understanding may 
provide a particularly useful arena in which proponents of HEC might press their case. 
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Often, putative examples of extended cognition are subject to conflicting intuitions. Some 
are happy to say that Otto believes (or knows) the information written in his notebook, 
while others are not. In this context, one of the principal advantages of HEMC over HEC 
is said to be that, by taking only what happens inside the head to be cognitive, it accords 
better with common sense and avoids uncomfortable extensions of our everyday mental 
concepts in cases like Otto’s. Once we shift our focus from belief (or knowledge) to 
understanding, however, the situation changes. In contrast to our conflicting intuitions 
over Otto, I have suggested, we have no hesitation in attributing understanding to 
Barbara. Our normal concept of understanding applies perfectly well in such cases. Of 
course, this does not settle the debate between HEC and HEMC. But it may provide 
further support to those who wish to argue for HEC by appealing to our everyday 
psychological concepts (e.g. Clark 2011). 
 7  Understanding as an ability 
Throughout the discussion so far, I have followed the characterisation of understanding 
found in much recent literature in epistemology and philosophy of science, which takes it 
to be a cognitive state that involves possessing various items of knowledge (or perhaps 
merely belief) and “seeing” or “grasping” the connections between them. If we construe 
understanding in this way, I have argued, it will often be an extended state that depends 
upon both internal and external elements. Sometimes, however, we find understanding 
characterised in rather different terms, as an ability to do various things, such as apply 
theoretical principles to the world (e.g. Chang 2009, Ylikoski 2009). What are the 
implications of extended cognition for this conception of understanding? 
If understanding is seen as an ability, then what Barbara’s case would seem to show is 
that we are willing to attribute understanding even where someone’s ability to carry out 
the relevant tasks depends heavily on the use of external devices. Put this way, however, 
we might seem to be led back to internalism. After all, it might be argued, it is Barbara 
herself who has the ability to apply the theory, even if she needs to rely on external props 
23 
 
to do so. We need to be careful here, however. There are at least two different ways to 
interpret the ability view. The first construes understanding in (broadly speaking) 
behaviourist terms. On this view, understanding isn’t any underlying cognitive state or 
process; instead, to possess understanding is simply to exhibit the relevant sorts of 
behaviours, such as applying formulas successfully (cf. Ylikoski 2009). On this reading of 
the ability view, it won’t make sense to ask whether understanding is internal or external 
(at least not in the sense at stake in disputes over extended cognition). On a second, 
alternative reading of the ability view, understanding is not seen in behavioural terms, but 
as a cognitive state or process that underpins the scientist’s ability to carry out the 
relevant tasks. As we have seen, in cases like Barbara’s, external devices are crucial for 
enabling her to accomplish these tasks. But the internalist might argue that these devices 
are merely part of the context in which Barbara exercises her ability, not part of the 
material basis of the ability itself. Notice, however, that, on this approach, understanding 
is no longer a distinctive state of “seeing” or “grasping”, but instead becomes a variety of 
different cognitive states or processes in different contexts. If Barbara makes heavy use of 
diagrams, for example, then her understanding might be identified with various sorts of 
visual reasoning. If instead she were to rely on formulas, then her understanding of Dutch 
roll might turn out to be a rather different sort of cognitive state or process. This 
internalist reading of the ability view would therefore seem to come at the cost of 
sacrificing the unity afforded by an extended perspective. Moreover, even if we view 
understanding itself as internal in this way, the cognitive processes that Barbara engages 
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 I would like to thank two anonymous referees for urging me to consider the implications 
of extended cognition for the ability view of understanding. Thanks also to Tom 




Extended cognition proposes a radical change to our view of cognition and mind. I have 
argued that it should also transform our view of the nature of understanding. 
Understanding is not always in the head. Instead, it involves brain, body and world. This 
extended view of understanding changes our perspective on many issues, including the 
subject of understanding, the psychology of understanding, and the relationship between 
understanding and explanation. Epistemologists have already begun to explore a range of 
areas in which extended cognition may impact upon theories of knowledge. If the 
argument in this paper is along the right lines, then the implications for inquiries into 
understanding will be equally far-reaching. 
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